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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DORIS C. RUCKER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DALEE. RUCKER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 18991 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree and an adverse ruling on 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, in and for Utah County, the Honorable George E. Ballif presiding. This 
appeal is pursuant to Rule 72 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The court below entered a default judgment and decree of divorce in the 
case Rucker v. Rucker on November 18, 1981. Subsequently, the parties stipu-
lated and agreed to set aside certain partiuclars but left intact the divorce 
decree. These particulars centered around child support, alimony and items of 
real and personal property that had been awarded to the Respondent. 
This matter was resolved on December 23, 1982 where the lower court de-
creed that child support and real and personal property would be granted to 
the respondent. This decree was entered through a default judgment. 
JI: 
On January 5, 1983, the appellant moved the court to set aside the 
decree rendered on December 23, 1982. This Motion was denied on January 2r, 
1983. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have this court affirm the lower court decisioo 
refusing to vacate a default judgment entered against the appellant, leavi 
intact the divorce decree and all particulars pertaining to the decree. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 12, 1981, a divorce hearing was held in the Fourth Judiciai 
District Court. The action was between the respondent-plaintiff and the 
appellant-defendant. The appellant was not present at the hearing and a 
default judgment was entered against him. The court awarded the respondent 
the decree of divorce and the terms prayed for in the complaint. (R.20, 
28-30). 
Subsequently, the parties, through their respective attorneys, agreed 
to a stipulation of certain particulars leaving intact the decree granting 
the divorce, custody of the couple's minor child and child support in the 
amount of $250.00 per month. This stipulation was initially refused by the 
court, but was granted on January 26, 1982 after an informal conference 
between the attorneys and the court. (R.31-33). 
On November 12, 1982, the counsel for the appellant moved to withdraw 
from the case. The Motion was granted. The court advised the aopellanr. tn 
obtain new representation, and to allow time for this to be done, vacatPrl 
the November 20, 1982 hearing date, setting it on January 5, 1983. (R 11'1 
The departing counsel, Nick Collesides, then sent a letter to the aopel :.,n: 
informing him of the trial date on January 5, 1983. (R.122). 
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After Mr. Collesides withdrew, the appellant contacted Wayne B. Watson 
'')r representation. Mr. Watson was unable to represent the appellant due to 
a court date on the same day as appellant's hearing. This information was 
rassed on to the appellant by letter dated December 27, 1982, and received on 
nr about December 29, 1982. This letter also stated that according to 
Mr. Watson's investigation, the January 5, 1983 trial date was still firm. 
( R. 123). 
In the meantime, it had been discovered that the January 5, 1983 trial 
date would conflict with the court calendar. The court had reset the trial 
date to December 22, 1982 and notice was sent to the counsel for the respondent 
and the appellant who at that time was prose. The appellant states that 
notice of this change was not received (R. 121) even though the notice was 
properly addressed. The respondent received the notice sent by the court. 
While the opening statements of the court on the hearing date of 
December 22, 1982 show that there is a question as to the January 5, 1983 date 
appearing in the file, this shows no confusion--only the question of why this 
minute entry was in the file. When the clerk explained the reason that the 
January 5 trial date had been changed, the question was answered. 
The December 22, 1982 hearing was not attended by the appellant. There 
's sworn testimony that states two witnesses saw the appellant receive the 
notice of the new trial date, and that the appellant's knowledge was assured 
through verbal confirmation in discussions with the respondent. (Tr.8-9). 
The court also heard testimony that the appellant was behind in alimony pay-
ments. Because of this, the respondent wished for jointly owned property 
1·1h1ch would provide rent income so reliance on alimony could be terminated. 
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The court entered a default judgment against the appellant, granting 
the respondent the relief she prayed for. This judgment was requesterl to bP 
set aside by the appellant because the absence of the appellant was due to 
mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect, and further, that he 
was prevented from appearing by the fraud, misrepresentation, or other misrnr 
duct of the respondent. (R.116). This Motion was denied by the court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT MAINTAINS CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION IN DECIDING WHETHER 
TO GRANT OR DENY RELIEF FROM A DEFAULT JUDGMENT, AND SUCH DISCRETION 
RE QUI RES CONSIDERATION OF THE TOTALITY OF THE CJ RCUMSTANCES, ENTERTAIN-
ING BOTH LEGAL AND EQUITABLE FACTORS. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent 
part, that: 
On mo ti on and upon such terms as a re just, the court may in furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding .... 
This rule allows the court considerable latitude in denying or granting relie' 
from a refusal to reopen a default judgment. By stressing that the court 
"may in the furtherance of justice," it is clear that the courts have the 
authority to resolve a conflict through the wise use of law and to temper 
the decision with equitable terms that are just. It is also clear that the 
court has complete discretion since it "may" grant relief, but it is not re· 
quired to do so. To grant or deny relief is not to be based on the courts 
arbitrary whim, but is intended to be based on the mature reflection of the 
totality of the circumstances. 
The most informative precedent concerning this appeal is Chrysle_r::_v_ 
Chrysler, 303 P.2d 995, 5 Utah 2d 415 (1956). Chrysler dealt with a husl,w'-
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rla1ntiff who suffered a default judgment when he failed to appear at trial. 
the husband moved the trial court for relief from the judgment under 
Rule 60(b), he was refused. On appeal, this court recognized that "it is 
generally regarded as an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to 
vacate a default judgment where timely application is made ... to the end that 
cases be decided on their merits." 303 P. 2d at 996, 5 Utah 2d at 417. The 
court went on to say that in a usual situation the refusal would be an abuse 
of discretion, but the circumstances of Chrysler took it outside the parameters 
associated with a usual case. This court found that the husband did not have 
clean hands when he came before the trial court asking for relief, nor had he 
pursued his action in good faith. The instant case is very similar to Chrysler; 
there has been a refusal to vacate a default judgment under Rule 60(b) and 
because of this the appellant claims there has been an abuse of discretion on 
the part of the trial court. 
The court in Chrysler cited several factors that it considered in denying 
relief under Rule 60(b). These factors included the failure of the husband 
to be present at an earlier Order to Show Cause hearing, his indifference to the 
divorce decree entered in Utah while he pursued a separate divorce action in 
Nevada, and his failure to personally appear before the court when his Motion 
to set aside the judgment was heard. 
In the instant case, there have been repeated instances where the appellant 
has failed to voluntarily comply with court orders, forcing the respondent to 
resort to legal means to gain what would normally be expected voluntarily from 
from the appellant. Two instances are illustrative of the lack of good faith 
on the part cf the appellant. The first concerns the original divorce decree 
issued on November 18, 1981. The appellant was not present at this imoortant 
hearing nor was he represented by counsel resulting in a default judgment 
against him. The second instance occurred when the respondent was forced tu 
obtain a court order compelling the appellant to comply with a Motion for 
Discovery pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedur·e. 
Illustrative of the appellant's lack of clean hands is his conduct di 
against the respondent and her son in September 1982. The appellant was 
turning off the gas to the respondent's house. When the gas was turned o" 
the pilot lights were extinguished, and when the gas was turned back on, the 
house filled with gas, creating a life-threatening environment. In order to 
avoid this hazardous situation, the respondent was forced to obtain an injure 
ti on which enjoined the appellant from turning off the gas, power or water. 
In its decision, the Chrysler court stated, "(n)otwithstanding the policy 
of liberality in granting relief to persons against default judgments 
have been taken ... it is not to be forgotten that Rule 60(b) under which such 
relief is granted states that the court may relieve a party from a final 
judgment in the 'furtherance of justice.' Manifestly the court should not 
follow the rule of indulgence toward the party in default when the effect 
would be to work an injustice or upon the opposing party. 
A prime requisite precedent to the granting of such relief is that the movant 
demonstrate that he comes to the court with clean hands and in good faith." 
303 P.2d at 966, 5 Utah Zd at 418. 
The instant case has been decided in favor of the respondent in llovembe' 
1981, yet for the past two years the respondent has had to resort to leqal 
action to obtain what is legally hers, each time tying up her time, enero 
and money. Surely to allow this case to continue on, especially 1vhen by do' 
so the party with clean hands, pursuing a good faith action, would be inror 
venienced, is unjust and inequitable. If this court were to analyze the 
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instant appeal considering only the law cited in the appellant's brief, it 
··JOulJ he understandable if a decision were granted for the appellant. While 
!dw cited by the appellant is good law, it is appropriate only as far as 
1t goe,, and in the instant case it does not go far enough. The analysis 
must go beyond pure legal means to invoke the equitable conscience of the 
court. Becauoe this appellant has not shown good faith in his actions, 
and does not come before the court with clean hands, this court should follow 
the precedent established in and affirm the lower court's decision 
denying relief under Rule 60(b). 
In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P. 2d 741, 123 Utah 416 (1953), this 
court again upheld a lower court's refusal to vacate a default judgment throu(11 
the use of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Warren court 
decided that equitable issues must be considered, and if they prove sufficient 
they would offset the reopening of a default judgment allowina the case to be 
heard on the merits. Warren concerned a suit instituted to quiet title to land. 
of the action was presented to a director and trustee of the defendant 
corporation. The director-trustee failed to notify the stockholders of the 
pending suit, and also failed to protect the interests of the corporation 
since it was not represented at trial and a default judgment was entered 
against it. The lower court refused a Rule 60(b) stockholder effort to have 
the default judgment reversed. The Warren court stated that "(e)quity con-
siders factors which may be irrelevant in actions at law, such as the unfairness 
of a party's conduct, his delay in bringing or continuing the action, the 
hardship in granting or denying relief. Although an equity court no longer 
has complete discretion in granting or denying relief, it may exercise wide 
judicial discretion in weighing the factors of fairness and public convenience, 
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and this court on appeal wi 11 reverse the trial court only where an abuse of 
this discretion is clearly shown." 260 P.2d at 742, 123 Utah at 417. 
The instant case presents equitable considerations for the court under 
each of the three categories mentioned in vJarren: the unfairness of a pai·t, 
conduct, his delay in bringing or continuing the action and the hardship in 
granting or denying relief. Since the respondent has already had the rulinq 
decided in her favor, it would be unfair for her to relitigate the decision 
being forced to chance losing what she has gained. As previously mentioned, 
the appellant's conduct does not warrant special considerations from the 
court. To reopen the litigation after it seemed to finally be at an end 
would be unfair, especially since there is sworn testimony stating that not 
only did the appellant receive notice of the trial date change but it was 
discussed on several occasions. (Tr. at 8 and 9). There have also been seve,o 
instances of delay since the instant case was initiated. The most notable 
examples have been the default judgments that have been entered against the 
appellant, one of which was reopened by stipulation, one of which has resultec 
in this appeal. Another delay occurred when discovery was held up until the 
respondent obtained a court order to compel the appellant's cooperation in 
this fundamental matter. Throughout the two years of this litigation, other 
deadlines have also passed delaying the expected support that the respondent 
had been awarded in her divorce decree. These deadlines concerned her alirnon 
and child payments. It seems clear that delay is part of the appellant's 
strategy and it should not be rewarded on this appeal. Fina 11 y, if this ca' 
is reopened it wi 11 result in a hardship to the respondent. Fi rs t, she ' 1 
again be frustrated in her quest to have the money needed to support hersPI' 
By delaying the termination of this litigation it lengthens the time before 
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the respondent can rest knowing she has enough income to sustain herself, it 
increases the likelihood that a much-needed operation can be taken care of 
bPfOrP the appellant's insurance coverage ends (Tr. at 9) and it increases 
the expense of time, energy and money which has already been greatly 
expended in this two-year divorce action. Because of these hardships, this 
court should follow the precedent decided in Warren and not vacate the refusal 
of the lower court to allow Rule 60(b) relief from a final judgment. 
In addition to the discretion that is made available to the trial court, 
there is a presumption that the decision made by that court is correct. In 
Warren, it was stated, "this court will not reverse the trial court where it 
appears ... that all elements were considered, merely because the motion could 
have been granted. This court will not substitute its discretion for that 
of the trial court in a case such as this." 260 P.2d at 744, 123 Utah 423. 
Because the trial court has had the chance to view the evidence, question and 
scrutinize the witnesses and to personally view each party and how their stra-
tegy is laid out, this presumption of correctness is justified. Because the 
trial court in this case has seen its development during a two year period, 
it would be completely justified to place the proper faith in the analysis 
used in denying the Rule 60(b) Motion. 
Finally, this court has held that "the requirements of public policy 
demand more than a mere statement that a person did not have his day in court 
when full opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded to him or his legal 
representative. The movant must show that he has used due diligence 
nnd that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had 
no control." Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 431, 
30 Utah 2d 65, 68 ( 1973). Airkem concerned a defendant who suffered a default 
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judgment and was refused relief upon Motion of Rule 60(b). The facts that 
led to the judgment included the defendant's counsel who attc>rnpled to withe· 
from the case on the date of trial (which was disallowed) and the inabiii'· ..
of the counsel and his client to communicate for 10 days prior to the trial 
Because of this confusion no one appeared on the defendant's behalf at triai 
This court ruled that the defendant should have been responsible for gettina 
in touch with the attorney, and that the time period between when he was infor· 
of the approximate date of the trial and the date of trial provided plenty 01 
opportunity and the failure to do so did not show reasonable diligence. The 
instant case would show due diligence in relying on the letters stating the 
January 5 court date if this was all that the appellant had to rely on. But 
as has been noted before, notice of the change was sent by the court clerk, 
such notice has been received according to sworn testimony and knowledge of 
the new trial date was confinned through conversation. (Tr. at 8 and 9). 
Therefore, due diligence cannot be shown by the appellant and this court shoui: 
follow the precedent set forth in Airkem and affinn the lower court's refusal 
to grant relief. 
POINT I I 
CASES THAT HAVE REVERSED THE LOWER COURT DECISION TO REFUSE RULE 60(G) 
RELIEF ARE CASES THAT ARE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE INSTANT 
CASE OR THOSE PREVIOUSLY CITED. 
The appellant has point out that there are several instances where tliis 
court has not allowed a trial court refusal of a Rule 60(b) Motion to stana 
These cases have not required this court to analyze the equitable factot"s dnc 
thus are the usual cases that Rule 60(b) was designed for, not the unusu 0 l 
cases where the totality of the circumstances had to be considered. 
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In Mayhew v. Sta_ndard Gilsonite Company, 376 P.2d 951, 14 Utah 2d 52 
1%2), this court stated that the "situation is patently one of the very kind 
tor which Rule 60(b) was designed to grant relief." 376 P.2d at 953, 14 Utah 
?d at 55. In Mayhew, summons were presented to a man that had resigned as an 
officer of the :orporation and thus had no authority to accept the summons 
or to commit the corporation to litigation. Because of the resulting con-
fusion, and because the defendant-corporation had not tried to avoid the 
litigation, this court ordered the lower court refusal under Rule 60(b) to 
be vacated. Mayhew presented no evidence of delay, of unclean hands or lack 
of good faith on the part of the corporation and thus it is a usual case 
mentioned in Chrysler that would require the court to grant the Rule 60(b) 
Motion. Because the instant case provides circumstances of delay, bad faith 
and unclean hands, it must be analyzed through both legal and equitable factors. 
Central Finance Company v. Kynaston, 452 P.2d 316, 22 Utah 2d 2B4 (1969) 
represents a case that was remanded to determine whether proper notice was 
provided to the defendant's counsel persuant to Rule 11 of the Rules of Prac-
tice of the Second Judicial District. Because the defendant's counsel was 
not present at the pretrial hearing when the court date was set, Rule 11 
establishes that notice be immediately provided to the absent counsel by the 
clerk. Confusion arose whether this notice was properly made and the case 
1;as remanded to determine this question. In the instant case, the court has 
'aken note that appellant, acting pro se on the date of mailing, was provided 
notice of the change in court dates. Since there is sworn testimony stating 
that the appellant received the trial change notice, and had made plans to be 
oresent at this new date the instant case need not be remanded. The Central 
court left the impression that if there was no notice provided, 
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the case should be reversed; but if the notice had been q1ven then the case 
should remain as decided by the lower court. Because of the facts in the 
instant case, this would lead to the lower court's decision to be upheld. 
In Interstate Excavating v. Agla Development, 611 P.Zd 369 (1980), 
the defendant suffered the withdrawal of his attorney. Upon this attorney', 
withdrawal, he mailed his ex-client notice of the upcoming trial date. The 
plaintiff's attorney also mailed notice of the trial date to the defendant. 
The defendant nor a representative, appeared at trial. Upon notification that 
a default judgment had been entered against him, the defendant contacted a 
new attorney and moved, in a timely manner, for Rule 60(b) relief claiming 
he never received notice of the trial date. The trial court was forced to 
weigh the knowledge that notice was sent to the defendant and his claim that 
he never received the notice. The trial court refused to vacate the default 
judgment and the case was appealed to this court, where because of the doubt 
of whether notice was received justified allowing the lower court decision 
to be set aside. 
The instant case is similar to Interstate Excavating because the trial 
court has taken note that notice of the change in the trial date was properly 
mailed to the appellant, but he claims that he never received the notice. 
But there is one crucial difference between the cases: whether witnesses 
testified that the defendant (appellant) received the notice. In Interstate 
Excavating, there is no testimony stating that the notice was receiveo but 
in the instant case, there is testimony stating that two witnesses saw the 
notice received. Again, there were no circumstances, as there are in the 
present case, that would require the equitable conscience of this court tu 
be invoked. 
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The case of Helgeson v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (1981) states the prob-
that have arisen from the lack of professional courtesy on the part of 
'.ounsel for the plaintiff. The plaintiff had suffered injuries in two separ-
ate dcc1dents, and his counsel began negotiating with an insurance adjuster 
rn order to settle the claims out of court. The plaintiff's attorney stated 
he would negotiate until the response date set for the complaint. The dead-
line passed without response from the adjuster and the attorney submitted the 
case to trial without notice to the adjuster resulting in a default judgment. 
The insurance company moved for Rule 60(b) relief but was denied. On appeal, 
this court held that the refusal was an abuse of discretion because "(t)he 
attorney was well aware that the adjuster and his company contested the amount 
sought by the plaintiff. With that knowledge, he must have expected that 
where he filed the lawsuits, the insurance comapny would defend them." 
636 P.2d at 1081. And when the plaintiff's attorney entered the case for 
default without contacting the adjuster, especially when the adjuster was 
waiting on information from the attorney, this court felt this provided grounds 
for reopening the case and therefore an abuse of discretion by the lower court. 
In the instant case, there has been no reliance by the appellant on respondent's 
oromises that has led to the default judgment. In fact, the promises that 
have been made concerning the trial have been made by the appellant (Tr. at 9). 
It is also evident that equitable circumstances arose in Helgesen when 
the case was submitted for default judgment without notice. This court took 
the totality of the circumstances in account and found against the party that 
had committed the inequitable act, allowing the case to be reopened to provide 
Justice to the injured defendant. In the instant case, this court should also 
take the total situation into account and resolve its decision against the 
13 
party that has committed inequitable acts, ttie appelldnt, and allow the lowEr 
decision to be affirmed. 
This court determined the question of whether Rule 60(b) should alLrw, 
appeal on a judgment after five years, or in the alternative whether a new 
action could be initiated in Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287 ( 1980) 
This court first addressed itself to dictum praising the virtues of Rule 
before deciding that the appeal was not timely and that the initiation of the 
new action would be barred by res judicata. This court did not address itse'' 
to any pertinent matters that would be of further help in the decision to the 
instant appeal. 
In State in Interest of Summers Children v. Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 331 
(1977), this court decided that an incarcerated father, who had not provided 
additional information in three previous hearings, could not claim an abuse 
of discretion when he was not allowed a new hearing to present his "wishes" ar: 
"hopes" for his children rather than concrete information on his parental p1,1r: 
This court summarized its findings by stating "(s)ince appellant's absence 
was a circumstance of his own volition, the ... determination was not an abuse 
of discretion." 560 P.2d at 335. If this court finds that this appellant 
was absent as a circumstance of his volition, it should al so find that the ·,J,, 
court decision was not an abuse of discretion. 
The instant case presents equitable considerations that requires analys' 
that goes beyond the superficial question of whether the lower court refu'al 
to grant relief under Rule 60(b) can be reversed, to whether such relief 
should be granted in this particular situation. Because this appellant has 
not pursued his defense in good faith, nor come before the court with clean 
hands, it is respectfully submitted that the lower court decision be 
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Th-is affirmation will provide Justice to both parties, will terminate the 
1 1 11r_iat10n for once and for all. If the case were remanded, the same decision 
'.·iri11l.J probably be reached because the appellant is not, and does not plan to 
"ay alimony An affirmation of the lower court refusal will alleviate further 
of time, energy and money 
15 
CON CL US I ON 
Since the lower court is empowered with considerable discretion, and 
has obviously weighed the legal and equitable factors involved in this case 
the decision reached upon the Rule 60(b) Motion is just and fair and should 
not be reversed. For this reason, the respondent respectfully requests that 
this court affirm the judgment below. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
/ f / !'/ 
}'"' /j- , /,, L_-1 .Y:t, ,•,.'{. / 
Richard L. Maxfield 
Attorney for Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed 2 copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to W. Andrew 
McCullough, Attorney for Appellant, 930 South State Street, Suite 10, 
Orem, Utah 84057, day of June, 1983. 
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APPENDIX 
Rule 72 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part: 
(a) From Final (Orders and) Judgments. An appeal may be taken 
to the Supreme Court from all final orders and judgments, in 
accordance with these rules .... 
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